30 March 2013

4 POINTS 4 PCOS (13 May '13)



The PCOS based AES cannot be trusted to secure the “sanctity of the ballot” for the elections on 13 May 2013, because the COMELEC continues to fail to restore the three (3) main safeguards for the integrity of the system – namely:

1. the digital signatures of the members of the Board of Elections Inspectors (BEI) and Board of Canvassers (BOC) to authenticate the election returns and certificates of canvass transmitted electronically,

2. the ballot verification utilizing ultraviolet lamps to detect and reject fake ballots,

3. the vote verification to give each voter presumptive assurance that his votes were recorded in the memory of the PCOS machine.

Furthermore, the COMELEC has rendered the RMA useless by pre-selecting and disclosing the precincts to be audited several days before the elections.


DIGITAL SIGNATURES

During the May 2010 elections, the COMELEC ordered all the BEI nationwide NOT TO USE their DIGITAL SIGNATURES in the wireless transmission of electronic election returns generated by the PCOS machine.[i] This left all the electronic election returns unauthenticated.

The disablement of the digital signatures constitutes a gross violation of the automated election law which clearly and expressly mandates that the “election returns transmitted electronically” must be “digitally signed” in order to be “considered as official election results” and “used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate.”[ii]

For the May 2013 elections, the COMELEC has again ordered all the BEI nationwide NOT TO USE their DIGITAL SIGNATURES to authenticate the wireless transmission of electronic election returns.[iii]
Again, this will leave all electronic election returns unauthenticated.

The latest COMELEC issuance reads in part as follows:

   “f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WITH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?", with a "YES" or "NO" option;
   “g) Press "NO" option. The PCOS will display "ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A DIGITAL SIGNATURE?" with a "YES" and "NO" option;
   “h) Press "YES" option...”
Thus, for the elections this year, the COMELEC will purposely, knowingly and deliberately repeat its gross violation of the automated election law, by disabling once again the critical safeguard of digital signatures, otherwise intended to authenticate all electronic election returns to be canvassed under the automated election system.


BALLOT VERIFICATION

During the May 2010 elections, the COMELEC disabled the built-in ultra violet lamps and ordered their replacement with hand held or portable lamps[iv]. However, no general instructions were issued to the BEI to guide them how to use either the built in or hand held lamp. In the end, no lamp whatsoever was used to detect and reject fake ballots inserted into the PCOS machines.

For the May 2013 elections, the COMELEC has not issued until today any general instructions on the use of either the built-in lamp or hand held equivalent to provide for ballot verification. Thus, it is apparent that COMELEC will again disable or otherwise disregard the use of any ultra violet lamp for the elections this year.


VOTE VERIFICATION

During the May 2010 elections, the COMELEC disabled the vote verification function of the PCOS machines that would have shown actual votes scanned and read. Instead, the PCOS machines merely displayed the presumptive lines: “Congratulations. Your vote has been registered.”[v]

In fact, these lines confirmed only that the voting process was finished, but not necessarily that the votes were actually read and recorded, because the actual votes were NEVER displayed.

For the May 2013 elections, the COMELEC has again disabled the vote verification function of the PCOS machines. Instead of displaying the actual votes scanned and read, the machines will again display the presumptive lines: “Congratulations. Your vote has been registered.” [vi]

Thus, for the elections this year, the COMELEC will again deny the voters the vote verification function, that would otherwise provide them with a presumptive assurance that their votes will in fact be read and recorded.


RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT

During the May 2010 elections, the COMELEC ordered that the precincts of audit be selected and disclosed at least six (6) hours before the close of the polls. This rendered the RMA highly questionable if not utterly useless, because it diluted the intended lack of predictability of the audit.

For the May 2013 elections, the COMELEC further aggravated the lack of the critical element of randomness, by ordering the selection and disclosure of the subject precincts, at least 4 days and 2 days respectively, before the close of the polls. There is now a total lack of randomness in the audit, because the selection of the subject precincts is not only predictable, but in fact pre-selected and disclosed days in advance of the elections.


May 2010 elections
May 2013 elections
Comelec Resolution No. 8837, 30 April 2010

Section. 7 SELECTION PROCESS OF AREAS TO BE AUDITED
a) Random selection of the clustered polling precincts to be audited will be done at the Philippine International Convention Center on May 10, 2010 starting at 12:00 noon by the TWG-RMA...
c) Guests may be invited to draw the clustered polling precincts from the tambiolo. The selection of the clustered polling precinct will be open to the media, political parties and other election stakeholders to ensure speedy dissemination of information and for transparency.
d) The TWG-RMA shall inform all concerned PES having jurisdiction over the clustered polling precincts randomly selected for the RMA.


Comelec Resolution No. 9595, 12 December 2012

S E C T I O N 5 .   Selection Process of Areas to be Audited -         

a) Random selection of the clustered precincts to be audited will be done not later than four (4) days prior to the day of the Elections by the RMA Committee.

a.1. Four (4) days before the day of the Elections, the List of Municipalities involved in RMA shall be released; and

a.2.    The List of Specific Clustered Precincts that will undergo RMA shall be disclosed two (2) days prior to the day of the Elections...

c) The selection of the clustered precinct will be open to the Media, Political Parties and other election stakeholders to ensure speedy dissemination of information and for transparency.

d) The RMA Committee shall inform all concerned Coordinators having jurisdiction over the clustered precincts randomly selected for the RZMA.



[i]                                                      
                COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Manila
         REVISED GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS (BEI) ON THE VOTING, COUNTING, AND TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 10 May 2010, NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.
                      RESOLUTION NO. 8786
                                 March 4, 2010
            Section 40. Counting of ballots and transmission of results; Procedure. (Renumbered) (As Revised)
    a) At the end of voting and before the start of counting of votes, the Chairman shall place the iButton security key on top of the iButton security key receptacle and apply slight pressure thereon. Remove the iButton security key from its receptacle, after which the PCOS will display the Main Menu;
    b) Press the "CLOSE VOTING" option in the Main Menu;
    c) The screen will display a message "ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT TO CLOSE VOTING? NO MORE BALLOTS WILL BE ACCEPTED AFTER THIS." Select "YES" option;
    d) The PCOS will request for the PIN of the poll clerk who will then enter his PIN and press "ENTER". The PCOS will validate the PIN and displays a message "PIN ACCEPTED". The PCOS will request for the second PIN from the third member who will then enter his PIN and press "ENTER". The PCOS will validate the PIN and displays a message "PIN ACCEPTED".
    e) The screen will display a message "POLL IS BEING CLOSED PLEASE WAIT" followed by another message "VOTING HAS BEEN CLOSED NO MORE BALLOTS WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THIS PCOS";
    f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WITH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?", with a "YES" or "NO" option;
    g) Press "NO" option. The PCOS will display "ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A DIGITAL SIGNATURE?" with a "YES" and "NO" option;
    h) Press "YES" option. A message shall be displayed "PRINTING 8 COPIES OF NATIONAL RETURNS. PLEASE WAIT";
    i) A message shall be displayed "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT" with a "YES and "NO" options. Press "NO" option;
    j) Thereafter, the PCOS will display "PRINTING 8 COPIES OF LOCAL RETURNS. PLEASE WAIT…" and the PCOS automatically prints the 8 copies;
    k) A message shall be displayed "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT" with a "YES" and "NO" options. Press "NO" option;
    l) Detach the 8 copies of the ERs. After which, members of the BEI shall affix their signatures and thumb marks thereon;
    m) The BEI shall ask the watchers present to affix their signatures on the printed ERs;
    n) Place each copy of ER in its corresponding envelope and seal with a paper seal;
    o) The chairman of the BEI shall publicly announce the total number of votes received by each candidate, stating their corresponding offices;
    p) The poll clerk shall announce the posting of a copy of the ER both for national and local positions on a wall within the premises of the polling place/counting center which must be sufficiently lighted and accessible to the public, and proceed to post such copies;
    q) After forty-eight (48) hours following the posting, the chairman of the BEI shall detach the posted printed copy on the wall and keep the same in his custody to be produced as may be requested by any voter for image or data capturing or for any lawful purpose as may be ordered by competent authority;
    r) The PCOS will display a message "READY TO TRANSMIT. PLEASE PLUG IN TRANSMISSION CABLE TO ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMIT ELECTION REPORTS AND PRESS OK TO CONTINUE";
    s) Connect the transmission medium to the PCOS and press the "OK" button;
    t) The PCOS will display a message "DETECTING MODEM";
    u) If the modem is properly connected, the PCOS will display the message "MODEM DETECTED";
    v) If checking of modem fails, the PCOS will display the message "MODEM NOT DETECTED" followed by the message "TRANSMISSION CABLE NOT CONNECTED. RETRY?" with "YES" and "NO" options. Check the connection of the transmission medium to the PCOS and if it is properly set up, press the "YES" button;
    w) If after three (3) attempts, the transmission medium still fails, call the Support Technician.
    x) The PCOS will display the following messages in succession:
    i. "IDENTIFYING TARGET SERVER
    ii. "SERVER IDENTIFIED"
   iii. "CONTACTING SERVER RETRIES ";
    iv. TRANSMITTING FILE [1/1] TO " with percentage of completion
    y) Wait until the message "ELECTION REPORT SUCCESSFULLY TRANSMITTED TO " is displayed;
    The same message will appear when transmitting to central server and KBP-Parties-Citizen server.
    z) After successful transmission to MBOC, KBP-Parties-Citizens and Central Server, the PCOS will display a message "ALL ELECTION REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TRANSMITTED TO 3/3 LOCATIONS. PLEASE DISCONNECT TRANSMISSION CABLE";
    aa) Disconnect the transmission medium. The PCOS will display a message "PRINTING TRANSMISSION REPORT. PLEASE WAIT…" Followed by a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT" with "YES" and "NO" options. Press "NO" option;
    bb) The PCOS will display a message "READY TO PRINT FINAL 22 COPIES OF ELECTION RETURNS. PLEASE REPLACE THERMAL PRINTER PAPER ROLL. PRESS OK WHEN READY" with "OK" button;
    cc) Replace thermal printer paper roll and press "OK" button;
    dd) The PCOS shall display the message "PRINTING 22 COPIES OF NATIONAL RETURNS. PLEASE WAIT" followed by the message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT?" with a "YES" and "NO" option. Press "NO" option;
    ee) The PCOS display the message "PRINTING 22 COPIES OF LOCAL RETURNS. PLEASE WAIT" followed by the message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT?" with a "YES" and "NO" option. Detach the printed 22 copies of Local Returns and press "NO" option;
    ff) The PCOS shall display the message "PRINTING STATISTICAL REPORT PLEASE WAIT" followed by the message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT?" with a "YES" and "NO" option. Detach the printed Statistical Report and press "NO" option;
    gg) The PCOS shall display the message "PRINTING AUDIT LOG REPORT PLEASE WAIT" followed by the message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT?" with a "YES" and "NO" option. Detach the printed Audit Log Report and press "NO" option;
    The Statistical Report, Transmission Report and Audit Log report shall be placed in the envelope (A18-A) where the Initialization Report was placed;
    hh) The PCOS shall automatically create back-up of files;
    ii) After printing the remaining 22 copies of ER, the members of the BEI shall affix their signatures and thumb marks on the 22 printed ERs and ask the watchers present to affix their signatures on the printed election returns;
    jj) If failure of transmission occurs in any of the target servers (City/Municipal, KBP-parties-citizens arm server, or central server), the PCOS will print Transmission Report.
    kk) The PCOS will display a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT" with "YES" and "NO" option. Press "NO" option;
    ll) The PCOS will display the Main Menu;
    mm) The certified IT-capable member of the BEI shall re-transmit the results to the target server by doing the following:
    i. Press "RE-TRANSMIT RESULTS" option located in the Main Menu. List of target servers will be displayed;
    ii. Press the target server to transmit;
    iii. Wait until the transmission is successful. If after three (3) attempts, the transmission medium still fails, call the Support Technician;
    iv. Repeat Steps i to iii, if there are more than one (1) target servers, where there are transmission failure.
    nn) Print the remaining 22 copies of ER and other reports by doing the following:
    i. Select "PRINT REPORTS" from the Main Menu;
    ii. The PCOS will display a message "PLEASE SELECT WHICH REPORT YOU WOULD LIKE TO PRINT";
    iii. List of reports will de displayed. Press the report that you would like to print;
    iv. The PCOS will display "PLEASE ENTER THE NUMBER OF COPIES TO PRINT" with a numeric keypad;
    v. Press the desired number of copies (For ERs, pres 22, for statistics report and audit log, press 1);
    vi. Press "ENTER" button. The PCOS will automatically print the number of copies desired for the report selected;
    vii. The PCOS will display a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO PRINT MORE COPIES OF THIS REPORT" with "YES" and "NO" option. Press "NO" option. The PCOS will display the main menu;
    viii. Print 22 copies of ER for local, Statistical Report and Audit Log Report by following steps (nn) (i) and (ii);
    oo) Create backup of files by following the steps below:
    i. From the Main Menu, press "BACK-UP AND PROTECT" option;
    ii. The PCOS will display a message "ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT TO BACK-UP CARD" with "YES" and "NO" options. Select "YES" option;
    iii. The PCOS will display a message "BACKING UP ELECTION DATA. PLEASE WAIT…" Wait until the message "BACK-UP SUCCESSFUL" is displayed;
    iv. The PCOS will display a message "WRITE PROTECTING RESULTS PLEASE WAIT…" Wait until the message "WRITE PROTECT SUCCESSFUL" The PCOS will automatically return to Main Menu.
    pp) Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the BEI shall not stop or postpone the counting until it has been completed;
    qq) In case a PCOS fails to count the vote or transmit/print the results, the Operator shall announce the error and undertake the necessary corrective measures. Should the Operator be unable to correct the error, he shall call on the Technical Support personnel assigned to the Voting Center for assistance. Such fact shall be noted in Minutes.

[ii]     Rep. Act No. 9369, Sec. 19. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
                SEC. 22. Electronic Returns... "The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate." (emphasis supplied)

[iii]    Comelec Resolution No. 9640, General Instructions for the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), on the Testing and Sealing, Voting, Counting and Transmission of Results in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, 15 February 2013, Sec. 51(f), (g) and (h).

[iv]    Comelec Invitation to Bid, Portable UV Lamps, April 2010.

[v]     Comelec Resolution No. 8786, Sec. 36(b).

[vi]    Comelec Resolution No. 9640, Sec. 47(a)(ii).

30 December 2012

Pre-loading CF Cards in the Automated Election System


PCOS Machines & CF Cards


A precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machine is an electronic device that uses an optical scanner to read marked paper ballots and tally the results in an automated election system (AES).i

Apart from counting the number of votes for each candidate, a PCOS machine also counts the number of scans made by the machine. The function of counting of votes and scans is controlled by the electronic voting software installed into a compact flash (CF) card embedded into the machine. The electronic vote count is generated and documented via the electronic election returns, while the electronic scan count is generated and documented via the audit log.

The eighth entry of the audit log is known as the protective counter. It indicates the number of scans done prior to any new scan made upon starting or restarting the PCOS machine. Where the CF Card is new and unused for any scan, the protective counter should indicate zero. Where the CF Card has been used but subsequently reconfigured, the protective counter should still indicate zero.

Under the premises, it is apparent that from the design of the subject AES, there is a built-in safeguard against any unauthorized scanning of paper ballots and counting of votes. This is the protective counter indicated in the eighth entry of the audit log.


Pre-loading of CF Cards


In Biliran Province during the May 2010 elections, the Comelec established 166 clustered precincts. Each clustered precinct was paired with a PCOS machine and corresponding CF Card. Out of the 166 PCOS machines and CF Cards, some 147 audit logs generated by the electronic voting machines from 147 clustered precincts were secured and made available to then Congressman and re-election candidate Glenn Chong. This represented about 88% of the total 166 audit logs from Biliran.
Based on the pronouncement of Comelec that all PCOS machines nationwide were subjected to testing by 10 paper ballots, and that all CF Cards throughout the islands were reconfigured in a week's time after the testing failed, then the protective counter indicated in the eighth log of the audit logs in Biliran should have indicated zero because of the reconfiguration. In the worst case that the CF Cards were not at all reconfigured due to physical impossibility and time constraints, then the protective counter should have indicated the number 10 representing the paper ballots used in testing.

Upon review however of the 147 audit logs from clustered precincts in Biliran, only 2 CF Cards corresponding to 2 PCOS machines surprisingly generated a protective counter of zero. The other 145 audit logs generated anomalous figures like 22, 28, 30, 38, 70, 96, 101 and 128. None of the audit logs produced the figure 10 which should have been the worst case number where no reconfiguration was made. By adding all the available protective count together, the total number of unauthorized ballot scans made prior to election day was a staggering 4,114.

Despite the obvious anomaly shown by the protective counters of almost 88% of the CF Cards and PCOS machines used in the entire Biliran Province, no explanation whatsoever has been offered by Comelec to justify this gross violation of established and pronounced procedures. Indeed the unauthorized pre-loading of scanned ballots is a gross anomaly that the AES successfully detected but failed to prevent.

Under the premises, it is only reasonable to conclude that almost 88% of the PCOS machines and CF Cards used in the clustered precincts throughout the entire Biliran Province, were IN FACT used without authority to scan paper ballots BEFORE election day in May 2010. In other words, unauthorized scans of paper ballots were IN FACT pre-loaded into the CF Cards BEFORE election day in almost 88% of the clustered precincts.


Constitutional implications of pre-loading of CF Cards


Under these premises, where CF Cards were apparently pre-loaded with scanned ballots even before the elections in almost 88% of the clustered precincts of an entire province, then it necessarily follows that the constitutional mandate to secure the “sanctity of the ballot” has been grossly violated during the May 2010 national and local elections.ii

Notably, the entire nation used one and the same AES during the May 2010 elections. Unless the Comelec can show that the anomaly in Biliran Province was actually isolated and not replicated nationwide, the technical presumption is that the massive unauthorized pre-loading of scanned paper ballots in an entire province is possible of replication nationwide.



This article was written ex-gratia by
Demosthenes B. Donato for Tanggulang Demokrasya.

All intellectual property rights are granted to the public domain.

21 October 2012. Makati City, Philippines.

i http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_scan_voting_system
ii 1987 Constitution, Article V, Suffrage, Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. (emphasis supplied)

Hacking the Automated Election System



Preliminary Statement

1. This paper is about the implications of the deliberate disablement by the COMELEC of the critical security feature of digital signatures in the Automated Election System (AES) used during the national and local elections of 10 May 2010.

2. For purposes of this paper, the various technical terms used in the AES may be defined as follows:

2.1. An Audit Log is the record of all the transactions processed by a particular Precinct Count Optical Scan computerized voting machine (referred to herein as PCOS), from the date of testing and sealing up to the close of the elections of 10 May 2010. The transactions here are entered in progression or otherwise recorded forward, with details of the date, time and description of the event.

2.2. A Print Log is the record of last 1000 transactions processed by the computer server of a Municipal Board of Canvassers. The transactions here are entered in regression or otherwise recorded backward, where the 1st entry is the latest transaction, while the 1000th entry is the earliest transaction.

2.3. An Internet Protocol address (referred to herein as IP) is a numerical label assigned to a particular clustered precinct PCOS or a particular Municipal server participating in the computer network of the AES that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address. The IP address serves 2 principal functions: host identification and location addressing. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address.

2.4. A Tally Number is the tally of votes for a particular elective position in a particular CP manned by a particular BEI. The Tally Number is comprised of 14 digits which are divided in 2 equal parts, where the first 7 digits indicate the CP number, while the last 7 digits indicate the elective position. The elective positions are as follows: municipal sanggunian, vice-mayor, mayor, provincial sanggunian, vice-governor, governor, district representative, party-list representative, senator, vice-president and president.


Unauthorized Transmission and Receipt of
Electronic Returns from an Unknown Source


3. During election day on 10 May 2010, the BEI of clustered precinct CP 7805002 in Barangay Bacolod, Culaba Municipality, Biliran Province, closed the poll at 19:21:05 under Entry No. 392 of the Audit Log.

3.1. The PCOS machine then generated the EML Data results file at 19:38:36 under Entry No. 407. Notably, the BEI did not use their digital signatures to authenticate the results at 19:38:48 under Entry No. 408. This is apparently in implementation of Subsection 40(f), (g) and (h) of Comelec Resolution No. 8786 which ordered all the BEI nationwide not to use their digital signatures.i

3.2. Thereafter, the PCOS machine repeatedly attempted but also repeatedly failed to transmit the EML Data results file to the MBOC server of Culaba Municipality, the Comelec central server and the KBP citizens' arm server. The several unsuccessful transmissions were recorded under Entry Nos. 411, 412, 413, 414, 417, 418, 419, 420, 423, 424, 426, 430, 432, 433, 437, 438, 439 and 440. The failed transmissions were recorded as “0 successful transmissions for 3 servers” under Entry No. 442.

3.3. After printing 1 copy of the Audit Log tape at 20:36:48 under Entry No. 457, the BEI closed the PCOS machine at 20:39:01 of 10 May 2010.

3.4. Attached as Annexes “A-1” to “A-4” are photocopies of excerpts of the Audit Log for Clustered Precinct No. 7805002-0006A, PCOS ID No. 7805002, Barangay Bacolod, Culaba Municipality, Biliran Province.

4. However, notwithstanding the manifest record of failed PCOS transmissions for CP 7805002, the municipal computer server of Culaba Municipality apparently received a transmission sent via IP address 10.12.3.143 purportedly for CP 7805002. The transmission was received at 23:23:23 of 10 May 2010 under Entry No. 808 of the Print Log. Notably, the time of receipt by the municipal server was about 3 hours AFTER the PCOS machine for CP 7805002 was closed by the BEI.

4.1. Upon receipt of the transmission, the EML Data was successfully imported and successfully processed under Entry Nos. 807 to 795 (read backwards). Notably, the first 7 digits of the Tally Number was 7805002 indicating that it was for clustered precinct CP 7805002. This is the same clustered precinct where the BEI closed the PCOS machine without any successful transmission.

4.2. Strangely, the computer server of Culaba Municipality received a second transmission of the same EML Data sent via the same IP address at 23:48:08 of 10 May 2010. The second transmission was however recognized as identical to the first transmission under Entry Nos. 792 to 779 (read backwards).

4.3. Attached as Annexes “B-1” to “B-4” are photocopies of excerpts of the Print Log for the computer server of Culaba Municipality, Biliran Province.

5. Thus, the Audit Log taken in relation to the Print Log clearly show that there was unauthorized transmission and receipt of electronic returns for clustered precinct CP 7805002 from an “unknown source”, because the sole authorized PCOS machine had been closed without any successful transmission.

5.1. Considering that all electronic returns bear no digital signature, as ironically instructed by the Comelec En Banc itself under the cited Comelec Resolution No. 8786, the determination of the authenticity of the EML Data electronically transmitted is systematically hampered.

Unauthorized Double Transmission and Receipt of
the Same Electronic Returns using Different IP Addresses


6. On election day of 10 May 2010 through the next day 11 May 2011, electronic returns from seven (7) clustered precincts of the Municipalities of Culaba and Caibiran, were received twice by the respective municipal servers via transmissions through different IP addresses. The clustered precincts from Culaba Municipality are as follows: CP 7805006, CP 7805008, CP 7805011, CP 7805012, CP 7805017 and CP 7805018. The clustered precinct from Caibiran Municipality is CP 7804011.

6.1. The details of the double transmission and receipt of the same electronic returns using different IP addresses are as follows:

CLUSTERED PRECINCT, BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY FIRST TRANSMISSION/RECEIPT SECOND TRANSMISSION/RECEIPT
CP 7805006
Barangay Bool West
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 493
11 May 2010
01:55:36
IP Add: 10.15.2.121
MBOC Log No. 262
11 May 2010
03:41:51
IP Add: 10.15.3.43
CP 7805008
Barangay Poblacion
Culaba Municipality


MBOC Log No. 479
11 May 2010
01:57:06
IP Add: 10.11.6.177
MBOC Log No. 324
11 May 2010
02:58:09
IP Add: 10.11.5.201
CP 7805011
Barangay Looc
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 902
10 May 2010
22:31:33
IP Add:10.11.11.139
MBOC Log No. 778
10 May 2010
23:51:01
IP Add: 10.11.19.202
CP 7805012
Barangay Marvel
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 465
11 May 2010
02:17:25
IP Add:10.11.2.192
MBOC Log No. 248
11 May 2010
03:46:23
IP Add: 10.11.0.117
CP 7805017
Barangay Virginia
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 888
10 May 2010
23:00:03
IP Add: 10.11.19.47
MBOC Log No. 521
11 May 2010
1:21:23
IP Add: 10.11.0.232
CP 7805018
Barangay Virginia
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 916
10 May 2010
21:03:28
IP Add: 10.12.41.14
MBOC Log No. 749
11 May 2010
00:20:25
IP Add: 10.11.13.140
CP 7804011
Barangay Cabibihan
Culaba Municipality
MBOC Log No. 712
11 May 2010
05:13:34
IP Add: 10.11.0.180
MBOC Log No. 526
11 May 2010
06:23:18
IP Add: 10.11.1.60

6.2. Attached as Annexes “C-1” and “C-2” are Tables of Electronically Transmitted Results summarizing data for the time and dates of the 1st transmission by the PCOS machines, the time and dates with IP addresses of the 1st receipt by the municipal server, and the time and dates with different IP addresses of the 2nd receipt by the municipal server.

6.3. Attached as Annexes “D-1” to “D-3”, “E-1” to “E-3”, “F-1” to “F-3”, “G-1” to “G-3”, “H-1” to “H-3”, “I-1” to “I-4”, are photocopies of excerpts of the Print Log for the computer server of Culaba Municipality, Biliran Province. Attached as Annexes “J-1” to “J-4” are photocopies of excerpts of the Print Log for the computer server of Caibiran Municipality, Province of Biliran.

7. Thus, the Audit Logs taken in relation to the Print Logs clearly show that there were unauthorized double transmissions and receipt of the same electronic returns for seven (7) clustered precincts: CP 7805006, CP 7805008, CP 7805011, CP 7805012, CP 7805017, CP 7805018, and CP 7804011, using different IP addresses between the first and second transmissions. Notably, the electronic voting results are intended for recording only once and not twice.

7.1. Considering again that all electronic returns bear no digital signature, as ironically instructed by the Comelec En Banc itself under the cited Comelec Resolution No. 8786, the determination of the authenticity of the EML Data electronically transmitted and received twice is again systematically hampered.


Unauthorized Double Use of One IP Address
for Two Different Electronic Returns


8. On 11 May 2010, electronic returns from two (2) different clustered precincts in the Municipality of Almeria, namely CP 7801001 and CP 7801002, were sequentially received by the municipal server via transmission through one and the same IP address 10.15.0.157.

8.1. The details of the double use of one (1) IP address for two (2) different electronic returns are as follows:

CLUSTERED PRECINCT, BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY FIRST TRANSMISSION/RECEIPT SECOND TRANSMISSION/RECEIPT
CP 7801001
Barangay Poblacion
Almeria Municipality
MBOC Log No. 261
11 May 2010
01:06:50
IP Add: 10.15.0.157
NA
CP 7801002
Barangay Poblacion
Almeria Municipality


NA MBOC Log No. 247
11 May 2010
01:23:53
IP Add: 10.15.0.157

8.2. Attached as Annex “K-1” is a Table of Electronically Transmitted Results summarizing data for the time and date of the respective transmissions by two (2) different PCOS machines, and the time and date of the sequential receipt of two (2) different transmissions but using only one (1) and the same IP address.

8.3. Attached as Annexes “L-1” to “L-4” are photocopies of excerpts of the Print Log for the computer server of Almeria Municipality, Biliran Province.

9. Thus, the Audit Logs taken in relation to the Print Logs clearly show that there was unauthorized double use of one (1) and the same IP address for two (2) different electronic returns pertaining to two (2) different clustered precincts CP 7801001 and CP 7801002. Notably, each clustered precinct is assigned a unique IP address under the AES to facilitate host identification and location addressing.

9.1. Considering again that all electronic returns bear no digital signature, as ironically instructed by the Comelec En Banc itself under the cited Comelec Resolution No. 8786, the determination of the authenticity of two (2) different EML Data electronically transmitted and received via one (1) and same IP address is again systematically hampered.


Concluding Statement


10. Under the premises, it is only reasonable to conclude that the deliberate disablement by the COMELEC of the critical security feature of digital signatures in the Automated Election System (AES) used during the national and local elections of 10 May 2010, systematically hampered the determination of the authenticity of any and all electronic election returns, thereby facilitating network intrusion or the hacking of the AES in manifest violation of Section 33 of the Electronic Commerce Lawii and the constitutional mandate to secure the “sanctity of the ballot”.iii



This article was written ex-gratia by
Demosthenes B. Donato for Tanggulang Demokrasya.

All intellectual property rights are granted to the public domain.

21 December 2011. Makati City, Philippines.

i Comelec Resolution No. 8786 approved on 04 March 2010 provides in part as follows...
f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message "WOULD YOU LIKE TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WITH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?", with a "YES" or "NO" option;

g) Press "NO" option. The PCOS will display "ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A DIGITAL SIGNATURE?" with a "YES" and "NO" option;
h) Press "YES" option. A message shall be displayed "PRINTING 8 COPIES OF NATIONAL RETURNS. PLEASE WAIT"...
The cited resolution was approved and signed by Comelec Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO, and Members RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, and GREGORIO Y. LARRAZABAL.

Notably, the said resolution was issued in violation of the new Section 22 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 on 23 January 2007, which expressly provides that election returns transmitted electronically be “digitally signed.”
ii Republic Act No. 8792, 14 June 2000.

iii 1987 Constitution, Article V, Suffrage, Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. (emphasis supplied)