Presentation of People's Draft to Congress on 06 February 2023

Presentation of People's Draft to Senate on 21 September 2022

Marcos-Duterte vs Robredo's 'proxy campaign'

 

By Dan Steinbock

May 2, 2022

The Philippine election is only days away. The highly popular President Duterte is likely to be succeeded by the Marcos campaign, which will build on his legacies.

DESPITE legal and political ploys against his campaign and assassination threats against his life, ex-senator Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr., the son of the controversial president Ferdinand Marcos Sr. (1965 to 1986), has consolidated his lead in the presidential polls (currently 57 percent of preferences). (See figure 1.)

FIGURE 1 PHILIPPINE 2022 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PREFERENCES

 

Source: Difference Group Ltd.; data from PUBLiCUS Asia, Oct. 1, 2021 - April 21, 2022

After the 2016 meltdown of the Liberal Party (LP), its aging stalwarts have promoted Maria Leonor "Leni" Robredo (23 percent), the incumbent vice president. But the effort to sell the polarizing Robredo as a "unity candidate" has failed. And other candidates attract only marginal support.

As the share of the undecided has shrunk, Marcos is the effective winner, assuming no last-minute political drama. Similarly, his political partner, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, the daughter of the incumbent president, dominates the vice presidential campaign (58 percent).

The Marcos-Duterte campaign benefits from a vital regional "lock." As the former governor of Ilocos Norte province, Marcos has a strong foothold in the north. Duterte dominates the south. And both are highly popular in Metro Manila.

Geopolitics, rearmament, nuclear weapons

Through her campaign, Leni Robredo has hoped to re-rebalance Manila toward Washington. In this quest, she has been supported by ex-Supreme Court justice Antonio Carpio, the vocal proponent of the "West Philippine Sea," and ex-Foreign secretary Albert del Rosario, a millionaire businessman-politician. They are the key players in the liberal anti-China coalition.

These efforts have been fostered by del Rosario's "think-tank" ADRi, whose parent Stratbase is linked with the US-based Bower Group Asia and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which is funded by US defense contractors. ADRi has tried to "make China the issue of 2022."

When del Rosario served as Foreign secretary, the Philippines filed the arbitration case against China. It was followed by the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which reopened the country to US military, ships and planes.

Today, the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is back in effect, thanks to Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr., Philippine Ambassador to the US Jose Romualdez, Carpio, del Rosario and certain oligarch support. Last fall, Locsin welcomed the new trilateral security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (Aukus), which violates the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Philippines also agreed to hold over 300 military activities with the US in 2022.

Setting aside patriotism vows, del Rosario's business associates in mining and oil extraction could gain hugely from concession rights in the South China Sea.

Opposition's 'proxy campaign'

Effectively, Robredo's campaign is something of a proxy effort. It is supported by the media that portray themselves as "independent," yet are funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which is financed largely by the US Congress.

According to the NED database, several Philippine media have received funds in the past three to five years, around $330,000 to $430,000 each, including Rappler, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), and to a lesser degree, Mindanews. Since local per capita incomes are less than 5 percent of those in the US, the funds employ hundreds.

However, these funds make up only $1.3 million of NED's total Philippine awards ($6.8 million). Some $4.5 million of the NED total goes to non-media organizations, including the "Young Leaders for Good Governance Fellowship" (YLGGY), which has netted $300,000. In the Philippines, it is depicted as a program of the Jesse Robredo Foundation, which honors Robredo's late husband and is controlled by her family members. In the US, the YLGGY is promoted as a project of the International Republican Institute (IRI), one of the NED's four subsidiaries. It is thus not entirely clear whose national interest the YLGGY represents.

Indeed, despite stated transparency, these organizations and their money flows are clouded by murkiness (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2 ROBREDO'S CAMPAIGN: MONIES AND MEDIA

US government funds are only a part of the proxy monies. Along with billionaire investor George Soros' Open Society initiatives, other private "philanthropies" play a role as well. Rappler has been financed by the secretive billionaire, Pierre Omidyar, a supporter of "pro-democracy" regime change in several countries. In addition to media exposure by the NED-funded media, the Robredo campaign has been fueled by CNN Philippines, Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer and other media, owned by local oligarchs or family dynasties.

Reportedly, the Robredo campaign has also cultivated ties with far-left insurgents (which it has vehemently denied), waging decades-long war against the Philippine government.

Building on policy continuity

In contrast, Marcos and Duterte hope to consolidate the President's Build, Build, Build infrastructure initiatives, while promoting investment on human capital and health care. They prioritize the industrial, agricultural and tourism sector to create more jobs. They support women's rights, legalizing divorce and abortion in severe cases.

In foreign policy, Marcos and Duterte would retain military ties with the United States. However, they also plan to continue to recalibrate the economic relationship with China, which has become the Philippines' largest trading partner, the second-largest foreign investor and the second-largest source of foreign tourists.

Eager to avoid military entanglements, Marcos favors a non-confrontational stance with China. Overall, he wants to treat other countries as "friends and hopefully allies."

Marcos and Duterte support regional integration with their Southeast Asian peers. They stress Philippine interests in the South China Sea but also the Asean talks with China hoping the bilateral regional Code of Conduct (COC) would be completed soon.

The two shun the kind of rearmament drives and nuclearization that would undermine efforts at accelerated economic development in the region.

Last-minute 'surprises'?

At this point, only foul play could change the expected outcome. There are concerns about the integrity of the Commissions on Elections (Comelec) and its election technology, which suffered a huge data breach in January that could affect the election.

Through Mark Malloch Brown, odd links prevail between billionaire investor George Soros' Open Society Foundations (OSF), Soros Fund Management and Comelec's election software (Smartmatic). In 1986, Malloch Brown led Corazon Aquino's campaign against Ferdinand Marcos and his ties have remained close with the Aquinos ever since. He is president of both the US-based OSF and chairman of Smartmatic.

The big question is whether the Philippine future will be driven by military pacts, which benefit just tiny economic elites, or peaceful development, which fosters the living standards of most Filipinos.

Rising prosperity is only viable through peace and stability.

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized strategist of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (USA), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net

The commentary is based on Dr Steinbock's recent briefings, his op-ed in South China Morning Post ("Philippine election offers opportunity to rethink the liberal narrative," April 29, 2022) and China-US Focus ("The Coming Marcos-Duterte Philippine Election Triumph," April 29, 2022).

https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/05/02/opinion/columns/marcos-duterte-vs-robredos-proxy-campaign/1842004

BRIEF ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

 1.     What are the background facts?

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute involves both territorial and maritime claims.[1] The claimants include Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan (China), and Vietnam.[2] The dispute relates to islands, reefs, banks, other features, and waters.[3]

In pursuit of their respective claims, the claimants have occupied various maritime features,[4] shown in the following map:[5]
 

See also the following map.[6]

Incidentally, a major party to the dispute is a nuclear-weapon State, China.[7] Aside from the SCS issue, China is also involved in other territorial disputes.[8]

 

2.     What are the applicable laws?

From the Philippine perspective, the applicable laws include the following:

a.     (a) 1987 Constitution, Article I, National Territory,[9]

b.     (b) Pres. Dec. No. 1596, Declaring the Kalayaan Island Group as Philippine Territory (1978),

c.     (c) Pres. Dec. No. 1599, Establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines (1978),

d.     (d) Rep. Act No. 9522, Defining the Baselines of the Philippine Territorial Sea (2009),

e.     (e) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal States and for other purposes (1982),[10]

f.      (f) Award, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2013-19, lodged by the Philippines against China (2016).[11]

UNCLOS as international law affirms that maritime resources beyond national jurisdiction are the “common heritage of mankind.” UNCLOS, Sixth Recital. It recognizes sovereignty only over archipelagic waters and the territorial sea (12 miles from baseline). UNCLOS, Articles 2 & 3. It mandates that the coastal State has the sovereign right to exploit and manage natural resources, living and non-living, in its EEZ (200 miles from baseline). UNCLOS, Articles 56 & 57. It provides that the coastal State has the sovereign right to construct or authorize construction of artificial islands, installations, structures in its EEZ. UNCLOS, Article 60. It states that the coastal State has the sovereign right to determine allowable catch of living resources in its EEZ. UNCLOS, Article 61. No State may subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. UNCLOS, Article 89.

Strictly speaking, to classify PCA Case No. 2013-19 as an arbitration award may be of doubtful legality. This is because only one party to the dispute participated, the Philippines. The other party to the dispute, China, did not participate.

Instead of classifying the case as an arbitration award, it may be more reasonable to cite it as an Advisory Opinion, having been rendered by an arbitration tribunal.[12] Notably, an advisory opinion adjudicates nothing and is not binding. However, it may nonetheless be cited as evidence of the law.[13]

 

3.     How do we move forward to resolve the dispute?

For the Philippines, the twin policies of “quiet diplomacy” and a “strong military” are suggested in dealing with other claimants, particularly China.[14]

For “quiet diplomacy,” we may take the following formal and informal actions simultaneously:[15]

a.     (a) conduct bilateral negotiations with China (i.e. technical and financial assistance agreement or service contract to develop energy sources [i.e. oil and gas) with 60/40 sharing of revenues; turn-over of possession of artificial islands inside PH EEZ [i.e. Mischief Reef] not later than the expiry of the service agreement; fisheries access agreement),

b.     (b) conduct multi-lateral negotiations with ASEAN plus China (i.e. Code of Conduct based on UNCLOS; zone of peace, freedom and neutrality; non-aggression pact; fisheries access agreement),

c.     (c) seek and establish relations with political / military / civil society groups in China and Taiwan (China), open to adopting UNCLOS, instead of the Nine-Dash Line, to the extent possible,

d.     (d) seek and communicate directly with the Chinese people (in Chinese language) through social media and mainstream media, to promote respect for international law, specifically UNCLOS, instead of the Nine-Dash Line (i.e. territorial claims refer to land; claims to territorial sea are measured from land; territorial sea is 12 miles only; there is no territorial sea for 1000 miles; there is no territorial claim solely to waters without land; even claims to archipelagic waters refer to the outermost islands).

For a “strong military,” it should be clarified that this is only meant to gain a respectable bargaining position in diplomatic negotiations with other claimants, particularly China. It is certainly not intended to pursue the taking or retaking of maritime features in the SCS through military action.

To this end, a “strong military” should be one that is capable not only of defending the Philippine EEZ, but a force also capable of projecting power beyond the EEZ. In realpolitik, this may be only way to persuade the other claimants, particularly China, to conclude a fair, just and equitable working arrangement with smaller States, like the Philippines.[16]

 

Atty. Dindo B. Donato

General Counsel

Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc.

14 April 2022. Makati City, Philippines.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of TanDem.

 

---

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_maritime_features_in_the_Spratly_Islands#Occupied_features

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea#/media/File:Spratly_with_flags.jpg

CIA. Cropped and Flags added by Estarapapax., Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

[6] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdfhttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1a/Spratly_Islands_in_the_South_China_Sea_Department_of_State_map_2016587286_%282015%29.jpg

United States, Department of State, cartographer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

[7] See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968).

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapon

[8] See Realpolitik in the South China Sea, D.B.Donato, 19 April 2020, that refers to contemporary history from approximately 1945 through the present, and reads in part as follows: 

“At the end of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), when the communists gained control of the mainland, and the nationalists retreated to Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took Uyghur in 1949, Eastern Kashmir in 1950, and Tibet also in 1950. These regions had long histories of self-rule, but the PLA forced their annexation. 

“The civil war in China resulted in the establishment of two de facto states on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait. The mainland adopted command economy, while the island embraced free-market economy.

“However, instead of accepting co-existence, like in North and South Korea and East and West Germany, the mainland pursued a One-China policy, isolating the island from the rest of the world, and reserving its “right to use force” for reunification.

“China also claims practically the entire South China Sea, with all the islands and waters covered by its Nine-Dash Line of demarcation.  This is so even without any historical evidence showing human settlements in the area.

“Realistically speaking, Chinese junk cargo ships that sailed only 5 knots, could not have exercised effective jurisdiction over islands, islets, cays and reefs 800 miles away. The Austronesian karakoa outrigger warships from the much nearer Southeast Asian archipelago sailed much faster at 15 knots.

“In 1982, China along with the coastal states of Asean, signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Among others, UNCLOS established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for coastal states.

“However, in violation of UNCLOS, the PLA constructed artificial islands and military installations right within the EEZ of the Philippines, i.e. Mischief Reef (1995).”

https://mainews.ph/features2/category/3-politics.html?download=62:realpolitik-in-the-south-china-sea

[9] Article I on National Territory of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows:

            “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with

            all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other

            territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or

            jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial

            domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the

            insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around

            between, the connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless

            of their breadth and dimensions, from part of the internal waters of

            the Philippines.”

[10] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

[11] https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf

[12] https://www.britannica.com/topic/advisory-opinion

[13] Id.

[14] COMMENTS on “Resolving PH-China maritime dispute,” D.B.Donato, 31 October 2019.

https://mainews.ph/features2/category/3-politics.html?download=56:comments-on-resolving-ph-china-maritime-dispute

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

People's Draft: Magkaiba man tayo ng kabihasnan, iisa ang ating pinagmulan. Magkaisa tayo para sa Inang Bayan.

 

The Journey to Sabah, Part 4

 

Preservation of Sulu Sultanate History and Rights by DD Krishna D. Kiram
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100035615757316

The journey to Sabah of Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram and his 235 followers, Part 4

 

Honoring the Legacy, Sacrifices and Patriotic Acts of Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram, Guro Bata Abdulhan Saradi, Guro Bata's Wife, his Son and the other 232 Followers during the 2013 Sabah Stand Off at Tanduo, Lahad Datu, Sabah.

 

That day served as a recollection in History of the Bangsa Suluk/Sug People and the Sultanate of Sulu, despite the magnificent odds faced by them and the difficulty to be able to escape from the mighty Malaysian Thirteen BN Military Forces during the February-March 2013 Sabah Stand-Off.

 

In the early morning of Day 6, March 6, 2013, Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram and his surviving and remaining followers reached the unguarded beach, a kilometer away from the intense Malaysian military operations throughout the Battle Zone in Tanduo Village. They used the darkness of nights to make a breakthrough and the thickly forested as shelter to cover their presence and kept them un-noticed by the huge number of Malaysian Mitary Forces combing the Tanduo village during the day.

 

Feeling a little space of freedom of movement, Raja Muda emerged himself from the thickly forest along the beach shoreline. He was immediately identified and recognized by the two followers, who from that day commenced their trip was uncertain of their mission to get through and get the Datu Raja Muda except merely was dependent on Devine blessings.

 

Acting on the dictate of their conscience, the two followers drifted their banca in the guise of fishermen about 100 meters away from the shoreline. As the Datu Raja Muda recognized them while paddling fastly the banca towards him, he commanded the followers hiding themselves to come out.

 

The banca can only carry a maximum of five persons. The given circumstance manifested again the followers' sense of patriotism and in upholding more importantly their voluntary services to the Sulu Sultanate and the Datu Raja Muda. Without further delay as time was of the essence, the followers reached the collective consensus. Once again, their dedications dictated them to forcibly carry the Datu Raja Muda into the banca to leave with his two sons.

 

Raja Muda's journey back to Tawi-Tawi occurred in broad daylight. Even prior to the outbreak of the 2013 Sabah Stand Off into a violent conflict on March 1, 2013, the Malaysian Royal Navy Boats were already stationed in the Lahad Datu Sea vicinity to monitor and stop food supplies and possible rapid deployment of reinforcing forces to the Datu Raja Muda. In the same process, Malacanang also sent the Philippine Navy Boat assigned to bring back to Tawi-Tawi the Datu Raja Muda and his followers. While crossing the Sabah and Sulu Sea, they pretended and acted as marginalized fishermen. They stopped and made themselves looked like fishermen whenever they saw Malaysian Royal Navy ship patrolled and crossed with their path in the territorial sea of Sabah. The Datu Raja Muda landed in an island in Tawi-Tawi nearest to the sea border of Sabah (North Borneo). The Sulu Sultanate’s supporters in the island kept the Raja Muda and his son’s presence unnoticeable from the other residence.

 

Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin's natural tendency to withdraw safely all the surviving followers still remained in seclusion in the thickly forested beach, a kilometer away from the battle zone, was his primodial consideration. His thoughts for them became his mental and physical exhaustion and greater than during the inhumane bombardment of the three Malaysian jet fighter planes, the day and night massive shelling and combing of the area by the thirteen Battalions of Malaysian Military and Police in the battle zone and against the pounding of massive shelling of their helpless situation in Tanduo village.

 

The Datu Raja Muda was bewildered as to whether or not to keep and maintain the secrecy of his presence and security in the island or to exercise his fresh freedom of mobility to openly and quickly secure means of transportations to withdraw the surviving followers.

 

On Day 7 of March 7, 2013, a day after he was withdrawn, he ordered three batches of non-powered engine bancas to sail in the night. The bancas were paddled by volunteering residence of the island at the direction of two same persons that withdrew the Raja Muda. They passed through un-noticeably by the Malaysian or Philippine Navy boat guarding and monitoring closely the expected possible exit passage of the Datu Raja Muda.

 

As the Datu Raja Muda was not present to make the decisions and to direct dispositions of remarkable tolerance as the three bancas cannot transport them all, the followers showed once more their sense of volunteerism. The degree of executing the withdrawal was very fast without time consumed in respect to the question of who will join first.

 

The three un-motorized bancas left the beach before mid-night of March 7, 2013, with still twenty-three surviving followers remained in the thick-forested beach. They utilized traditional compass liked the stars and sparkling lights of underlying islands to determine the directions of their path to freedom. Amidst the darkness and stillness of the night that almost made them deaf coupled with the strong sea current between Sabah and Tawi-Tawi, they have to re-route their courses upon seeing lights appeared from a suspected boats and horizons. The situations surrounding them brought the three bancas apart from each other. For nearly five hours, they sailed and paddled their bancas through the Sabah Sea without having been detected by the Malaysian Royal Navy.

 

One of the bancas carrying 37 surviving followers realized upon daybreak that they paddled their bancas' course towards the Philippine Navy. They were intercepted and treated as humanely as possible and as Filipino citizens by Officers and Men and Women in Uniform in the Philippine Navy boat. They were brought to its Base in Bata-Bata, Panglima Sugala, Tawi-Tawi, for interrogation. The litigation of the case of the thirty-seven followers, where three of them already succumbed to natural death, is not yet resolved despite of no witnesses against them since 2013.

 

Un-perturbed by faith of the 37 followers, another three un-motorized banca, a little bit smaller than the first three bancas, left from the island in the evening of Day 8 of March 8, 2013. The mission was to get through and bring back the last 23 remaining followers still in the beach of Sabah.

 

At this stage, the evacuation and survival of the 23 were done despite the absolute subjectivity of their physical strength during the more than 10 hours paddling the bancas in a round trip. Just liked the blowing of the winds to preserve the freshness of the sea from the foulness as a result of a prolonged calm, urged them, as volunteers, to save the 23 lives in accordance with the fundamental and absolute ideality and destiny of the Sulu Sultanate’s hope for the survival of its ancestral rights and patrimony. That subjectivity in the recent time was fought against the Thirteen (13) Battalions Malaysian Forces that led the 2013 Sabah Stand Off watered by blood and soul of the 235 followers.

 

To be continued.

 

Abraham J. Ibarani-Idnirani

Chairman

Center for Studies of History of

Sulu Archipelago

 

March 13, 2021

 

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=268559338172043&id=114362470258398

Image by Wikimedia Commons, Cccefalon

The Journey to Sabah, Part 3

 

Preservation of Sulu Sultanate History and Rights by DD Krishna D. Kiram
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100035615757316

The journey to Sabah of Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram and his 235 followers, Part 3

 

Honoring the Legacy, Sacrifices and Patriotic Acts of Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram, Guro Bata Abdulhan Saradi, Guro Bata, his son, and the other 232 followers of the Sultanate of Sulu during the 2013 Sabah Stand Off from March 1-15, 2013.

 

As a result of growing tension in Tanduo, Lahad Datu, Sabah, WORD WAR ERUPTED between spokespersons of Malacanang and the Royal Sulu Sultanate Media Center. The Spokesperson of PNoy Aquino Administration IMPULSIVELY RE-ECHOED the MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT’S ACCUSATION against the Datu Raja Muda and his 235 followers AS INTRUDERS and INFRINGING the TERRITORIAL RIGHTS of MALAYSIA over SABAH (NORTH BORNEO). The PNoy Aquino Administration DEFENDED Malaysia’s consigned and relegated rights, powers, and authority invested on Malaysia by Great Britain in 1963. They also Treated Datu Raja Muda and his followers NO LONGER CITIZENS of the Philippines while being under SIEGE by the Malaysian military forces.

 

The PNoy Administration's Policy towards the Datu Raja Muda FIRMLY STRENGTHENED MALAYSIA’S TREATMENT of PRESENCE of the Datu Raja Muda and his 235 followers NO LONGER A POLICE MATTER but ENEMY of MALAYSIA.

 

The Administration of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III had transformed itself into a VOICE of the Malaysian Government. His Presidency ABANDONED the constitutional protection and guarantee bestowed on the Sultan of Sulu as an Ordinary Citizen by the Philippine Government since 1935 and by his Administration, who, in 2010 assumed also the constitutional duty and responsibility to uphold and honor the Sabah Claim as a national Contract entered and signed between the Republic of the Philippines and the Sultanate of Sulu in 1962.

 

The Malaysian Government's wrongdoings infringed absolutely the modes of pacific settlement of disputes as provided for under the United Nations Charter Resolution. Malaysia violated also the principles and agreements and the Joint-Communique embodied in the 1963 Manila Accord mutually signed by the Three Heads of States, Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, President Sukarno of Indonesia and President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines.

 

Unliked other Presidents that were elected before him in the likes of President Diosdado Macapagal and President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who sworn to protect the National Contract for the peaceful settlement of Sabah Claim against Malaysia, the PNoy Administration, instead, ADMONISHED Sultan Jamalul Kiram III and his Royal Clan that full force of the law will be applied against them in view of the action taken by Datu Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram and his 235 followers.

 

President PNoy Aquino's stern warning had lost sight on the legal importance of the fact of the matter. That by virtue of the Sultan of Sulu's Act, the Philippine national territory expanded after the latter agreed to issue the Republic of the Philippines "The 1962 Conditional Transfer of Sovereignty Rights Over North Borneo (Sabah)".

 

The Sultanate of Sulu ALSO TOOK MANY FORMS OF LEGAL HARASSMENT from the AQUINO ADMINISTRATION. The harassment encouraged the Malaysian Government in Kuala Lumpur to send its AGENTS to Manila TO ASSASINATE SULTAN JAMALUL KIRAM III and ALL HIS SENIOR FOLLOWERS. HIS ADMINISTRATION threatened also Sultan Jamalul Kiram III and his siblings as conveyed by HIS Duly DESIGNATED NEGOTIATORS to IMPRISON or REPATRIATE Them to Malaysia if Raja Muda and his followers WOULD NOT GIVE IN To the MALAYSIAN DEMAND TO RETURN to the PHILIPPINES.

 

PNoy Aquino's threatening words IMPELLED 33rd Sultan Jamalul Kiram III to ESCUSE HIMSELF and ABSTAIN from the dialogue regarding the stand off between him and the Malacanang duly designated and authorized representatives. LOSING SIGHT OF HIS STATUS as A SPIRITUAL and POLITICAL LEADER, the 33rd Sultan of Sulu left the table and decreed Abraham J. Idjirani, to continue the dialogue with the MALACANANG DULY DESIGNATED NEGOTIATOR in that crucial night. In the morning, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III CHALLENGED MALACANANG before the local and foreign media TO WIDEN THE PHILIPPINE PRISON CELL as many of his relatives and the Bangsa Suluk/Sug supporters would follow him.

 

The growing tension and Malaysia’s MASSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS were no doubt owed to Malaysia's FEELING MIGHTY against the OBSOLETE FEW HAND-GUN and NATIVE SHARPENED BARONG and KRIS of Raja Muda's followers brought by the followers TO PROTECT HIM on their JOURNEY BACK HOME TO SABAH against lawless elements and pirates plying the Sitangkai Strait.

 

As already mentioned, the URGENT SITUATION compelled Sultan Jamalul Kiram III accompanied by his wife and a sister, Dayang Dayang Sitti Krishna Kiram (Idjirani), a brother, Datu Abdilnasser D. Kiram, Pastor “Boy” Saycon and Abraham J. Idjirani to seek the assistance AT MIDNIGHT of VICE PRESIDENT JEJOMAR BINAY in his Vice Presidential Residence in Makati. The APPEAL was acted on advice of MR. PASTOR “BOY” SAYCON, the Sulu Sultanate Adviser on Foreign Affairs. The APPEAL sought on the Vice President was to FACILITATE an EARLY MORNING MEETING of March 1, 2013, between the Malaysian Ambassador to the Philippines and the Sultanate of Sulu’s representatives, the Secretary-General and Spokesperson, Abraham J. Idjirani, and the Sultan and Datu Raja Muda’s brother, Datu Abdilnasser D. Kiram, concurrent present Datu Maharadja Lailah and 3rd in line to the throne of Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo.

 

The requested meeting was to discuss the parameter of PREVENTING the IMMINENT OUTBREAK of an ARMED CONFLICT between the highly trained and well-equipped Malaysian soldiers, commando and police and the Datu Raja Muda with his 235 armless followers.

 

Out of humanitarian service and in his power and capacity as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines, Vice President Jejomar Binay intervened and conveyed by telephone call in that night of February 28, 2013 Sultan Jamalul Kiram III’s request to the Malaysian Ambassador. The Malaysian Ambassador agreed and granted the request.

 

At 8:00 O'clock a.m. of March 1, 2013, while the Sulu Sultanate’s designated representatives was on its way, the FIRST SHOT of the MALAYSIAN FORCES WAS FIRED TOWARDS DATU RAJA MUDA AGBIMUDDIN KIRAM but missed him. On that day, Friday, March 1, 2013, the first day of battle at Tanduo Village, Lahad Datu, Sabah, begun.

To be continued.

 

Abraham J. Ibarani-Idjirani

Chairman

Center for Studies of History of

Sulu Archipelago

 

March 4, 2021

https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=627204181810101&id=100035615757316

Image by Wikimedia Commons, Cccefalon