Pre-loading CF Cards in the Automated Election System

PCOS Machines & CF Cards

A precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machine is an electronic device that uses an optical scanner to read marked paper ballots and tally the results in an automated election system (AES).ⁱ

Apart from counting the number of votes for each candidate, a PCOS machine also counts the number of scans made by the machine. The function of counting of votes and scans is controlled by the electronic voting software installed into a compact flash (CF) card embedded into the machine. The electronic vote count is generated and documented via the electronic election returns, while the electronic scan count is generated and documented via the audit log.

The eighth entry of the audit log is known as the protective counter. It indicates the number of scans done prior to any new scan made upon starting or restarting the PCOS machine. Where the CF Card is new and unused for any scan, the protective counter should indicate zero. Where the CF Card has been used but subsequently reconfigured, the protective counter should still indicate zero.

Under the premises, it is apparent that from the design of the subject AES, there is a built-in safeguard against any unauthorized scanning of paper ballots and counting of votes. This is the protective counter indicated in the eighth entry of the audit log.

Pre-loading of CF Cards

In Biliran Province during the May 2010 elections, the Comelec established 166 clustered precincts. Each clustered precinct was paired with a PCOS machine and corresponding CF Card. Out of the 166 PCOS machines and CF Cards, some 147 audit logs generated by the electronic voting machines from 147 clustered precincts were secured and made available to then Congressman and re-election candidate Glenn Chong. This represented about 88% of the total 166 audit logs from Biliran.

Based on the pronouncement of Comelec that all PCOS machines nationwide were subjected to testing by 10 paper ballots, and that all CF Cards throughout the islands were reconfigured in a week's time after the testing failed, then the protective counter indicated in the eighth log of the audit logs in Biliran should have indicated zero because of the reconfiguration. In the worst case that the CF Cards were not at all reconfigured due to physical impossibility and time constraints, then the protective counter should have indicated the number 10 representing the paper ballots used in testing.

Upon review however of the 147 audit logs from clustered precincts in Biliran, only 2 CF Cards corresponding to 2 PCOS machines surprisingly generated a protective counter of zero. The other 145 audit logs generated anomalous figures like 22, 28, 30, 38, 70, 96, 101 and 128. None of the audit logs produced the figure 10 which should have been the worst case number where no reconfiguration was made. By adding all the available protective count together, the total number of unauthorized ballot scans made prior to election day was a staggering 4,114.

Despite the obvious anomaly shown by the protective counters of almost 88% of the CF Cards and PCOS machines used in the entire Biliran Province, no explanation whatsoever has been offered by Comelec to justify this gross violation of established and pronounced procedures. Indeed the unauthorized pre-loading of scanned ballots is a gross anomaly that the AES successfully detected but failed to prevent.

Under the premises, it is only reasonable to conclude that almost 88% of the PCOS machines and CF Cards used in the clustered precincts throughout the entire Biliran Province, were IN FACT used without authority to scan paper ballots BEFORE election day in May 2010. In other words, unauthorized scans of paper ballots were IN FACT pre-loaded into the CF Cards BEFORE election day in almost 88% of the clustered precincts.

Constitutional implications of pre-loading of CF Cards

Under these premises, where CF Cards were apparently pre-loaded with scanned ballots even before the elections in almost 88% of the clustered precincts of an entire province, then it necessarily follows that the constitutional mandate to secure the “sanctity of the ballot” has been grossly violated during the May 2010 national and local elections.ⁱⁱ

Notably, the entire nation used one and the same AES during the May 2010 elections. Unless the Comelec can show that the anomaly in Biliran Province was actually isolated and not replicated nationwide, the technical presumption is that the massive unauthorized pre-loading of scanned paper ballots in an entire province is possible of replication nationwide.

This article was written ex-gratia by

Demosthenes B. Donato for Tanggulang Demokrasya.

All intellectual property rights are granted to the public domain.

21 October 2012. Makati City, Philippines.

i http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_scan_voting_system

ii 1987 Constitution, Article V, Suffrage, Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. (emphasis supplied)