Comments on "Misuari's Failure"

From: DINDO B. DONATO <dbdonato@info.com.ph>
To: <rdavid@pacific.net.ph>
Sent: Monday, November 26, 2001 1:01 AM
Subject: (Comments on “Misuari's Failure”)

Dear Mr. David...

My comments are as follows:

1. I do not believe that the 1996 Peace Agreement can already be deemed a failure at this time. On the contrary, I believe it has … been successful … (on) the aspect that counts the most, that is the aspect of “national security.” (For) as long as the overwhelming majority of the Muslim MNLF integrees remain with the Christian dominated AFP, the 1996 Peace Agreement can … rightfully and legitimately be considered a success. (The continuing good) working relationship between the MNLF integrees and the rest of the AFP, is the best living proof that Muslim Filipinos can live peacefully with Christian Filipinos.

2. For lack of personal knowledge, I (cannot) comment on the serious allegation of (Nur) Misuari that (Norberto) Gonzales of Malacanang purportedly participated in the supposed conspiracy to force him out of power. I can say however that if indeed the overwhelming majority of the MNLF leaders and members truly want (Nur) Misuari out as their leader, Malacanang has no choice but to deal with the new collective leadership, in the interest of national security, political stability and long-term socio-economic growth. At the end of the day, we must remember that Mindanao does not belong to (Nur) Misuari alone, but rather Mindanao belongs to all its people. If the times require that the “old man” of the MNLF must now give way to the new collective leadership, (if) only to facilitate better government-MNLF cooperation, then so be it.

3. Again for lack of personal knowledge, I (cannot) comment on the purported failure of (Nur) Misuari to deliver socio-economic projects, as well as his alleged malversation of government funds. I would rather have the records speak for themselves. In this regard, I await the publication of more detailed government audit reports on the performance and integrity of (Nur) Misuari on the matter of socio-economic projects and government funds.

4. With respect however to the matters of political leadership and statesmanship, I (agree) that (Nur) Misuari indeed failed when he rallied his loyal followers to take up arms against the government, using the age-old anti-Christian propaganda lines and slogans, (and) apparently hiding his real motive of personal vengeance against the government who sided with his adversaries from within the MNLF. Perhaps (Nur) Misuari was deeply hurt and embarrassed by the turn of events within the MNLF organization. Nonetheless, no one can deny that such personal pain will have to give way to the greater interest of peace. We cannot plunge into another war simply because (Nur) Misuari feels the need to uphold his personal pride and regain his political power. (We) must remember that in a country with a functioning democratic government, such as our country, there is no legitimate justification whatsoever for armed rebellion (except perhaps in the face of widespread human rights violations and as a matter of self defense). We (need) to realize that armed rebellion is by itself a major cause of poverty. Armed rebellion must end in order for real socio-economic progress to begin. (Incidentally, this comment also applies to the other rebel groups, i.e. NPA and MILF.)

5. Regarding the ARMM experiment, I (believe) that (this) concept (of having) another level of local government vested with both executive and legislative powers for the governance of the Muslim community, is most unwise and imprudent.

Firstly, the ARMM name itself that suggests exclusive application to the Muslim community (impliedly excluding the Christian and tribal communities of Mindanao), already serves to divide further the people (concerned). The Christians and Muslims of Mindanao already know that their deep animosities against each other have divided them for centuries. There is no point to be served in dividing them further by establishing this ARMM for the Muslim areas, and maintaining another structure of regional government for the Christian and tribal areas. In the interest of long-term peace and co-existence, what we need to do is to discard all these structures which … discriminate and segregate, and instead focus on uniform structures and common socio-cultural practices (which equalize and integrate). This way, we can (promote) the development of a sense of unity and commonality among all the people involved.

Secondly, the vesting of legislative power in the ARMM laws the groundwork for (complicating) the legal system (governing) the (territory) covered. In (this) age (of) globalization, governments all over the world need to streamline their bureaucracies and simplify their legal processes in order to attract (and encourage) private sector (economic) activities. With the ARMM legislature, we are doing exactly the opposite. As we (now) see, compliance with the requirements of the (existing) national laws already burdens the private sector. We can just imagine the negative impact on economic activities if private sector has to contend with another set of regional laws, in addition to the national laws.

Thirdly, the establishment of the ARMM as a local government unit, requiring the conduct of a referendum to ascertain voter consent to its coverage, puts too much political uncertainty to the formation of a regional government body. As we now know, when voter sentiment was ascertained, only the Muslim areas voted in the affirmative, while all the Christian and tribal areas voted in the negative. Here again we have another instance of further division. Is this the formula for long-term peace and co-existence?

6. Based on my legal experience as the former general-counsel of the JPDC (John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation), the implementing arm of the BCDA (Bases Conversion Development Authority), taken together with research work done on existing regional initiatives, specifically the Davao Integrated Development Plan (covering all the cities and provinces [of] the Davao region), I believe there is a cost-effective alternative to the ARMM (that) may benefit not only the Muslim areas but also all the other Christian and tribal (community) areas in Mindanao.

The (proposed) alternative structure … is basically (patterned after) the (existing) BCDA/SBMA structure, minus the (scheme for) tax and duty free incentives. Under this alternative structure, there is no regional legislature, but only a regional executive. Accordingly, policy formulation will be a national function, while policy implementation will be a regional function. This combines the benefits of a uniform (regional) legal system on the one hand, and (a) strong regionalized hands-on (executive) on the other hand.

The cost for the establishment of the alternative government structure will be minimal because no new level of bureaucracy is created. The existing regional offices of the national executive line departments will merely be spinned-off to create the new regional administrative authority.

Considering that government experience in administering area-based development agencies have been limited to smaller areas (such as the municipalities or parts of municipalities covered by the BCDA), the prudent way to go would be to limit the size of a given region to that which is relatively smaller and therefore more manageable. The Davao region or the Socsargen region would be good examples of what would be a relatively smaller region, compared to the (larger) area comprised of the entire Western Mindanao (under) the SPCPD which formed part of the ARMM experiment.

(Incidentally, this alternative structure may also apply to all the other existing administrative regions in Luzon and the Visayas)...

Sincerely,
Dindo Donato
Makati City