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Marcos-Duterte vs Robredo's 'proxy campaign'

 

By Dan Steinbock

May 2, 2022

The Philippine election is only days away. The highly popular President Duterte is likely to be succeeded by the Marcos campaign, which will build on his legacies.

DESPITE legal and political ploys against his campaign and assassination threats against his life, ex-senator Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr., the son of the controversial president Ferdinand Marcos Sr. (1965 to 1986), has consolidated his lead in the presidential polls (currently 57 percent of preferences). (See figure 1.)

FIGURE 1 PHILIPPINE 2022 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PREFERENCES

 

Source: Difference Group Ltd.; data from PUBLiCUS Asia, Oct. 1, 2021 - April 21, 2022

After the 2016 meltdown of the Liberal Party (LP), its aging stalwarts have promoted Maria Leonor "Leni" Robredo (23 percent), the incumbent vice president. But the effort to sell the polarizing Robredo as a "unity candidate" has failed. And other candidates attract only marginal support.

As the share of the undecided has shrunk, Marcos is the effective winner, assuming no last-minute political drama. Similarly, his political partner, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, the daughter of the incumbent president, dominates the vice presidential campaign (58 percent).

The Marcos-Duterte campaign benefits from a vital regional "lock." As the former governor of Ilocos Norte province, Marcos has a strong foothold in the north. Duterte dominates the south. And both are highly popular in Metro Manila.

Geopolitics, rearmament, nuclear weapons

Through her campaign, Leni Robredo has hoped to re-rebalance Manila toward Washington. In this quest, she has been supported by ex-Supreme Court justice Antonio Carpio, the vocal proponent of the "West Philippine Sea," and ex-Foreign secretary Albert del Rosario, a millionaire businessman-politician. They are the key players in the liberal anti-China coalition.

These efforts have been fostered by del Rosario's "think-tank" ADRi, whose parent Stratbase is linked with the US-based Bower Group Asia and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which is funded by US defense contractors. ADRi has tried to "make China the issue of 2022."

When del Rosario served as Foreign secretary, the Philippines filed the arbitration case against China. It was followed by the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which reopened the country to US military, ships and planes.

Today, the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is back in effect, thanks to Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr., Philippine Ambassador to the US Jose Romualdez, Carpio, del Rosario and certain oligarch support. Last fall, Locsin welcomed the new trilateral security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (Aukus), which violates the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Philippines also agreed to hold over 300 military activities with the US in 2022.

Setting aside patriotism vows, del Rosario's business associates in mining and oil extraction could gain hugely from concession rights in the South China Sea.

Opposition's 'proxy campaign'

Effectively, Robredo's campaign is something of a proxy effort. It is supported by the media that portray themselves as "independent," yet are funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which is financed largely by the US Congress.

According to the NED database, several Philippine media have received funds in the past three to five years, around $330,000 to $430,000 each, including Rappler, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), and to a lesser degree, Mindanews. Since local per capita incomes are less than 5 percent of those in the US, the funds employ hundreds.

However, these funds make up only $1.3 million of NED's total Philippine awards ($6.8 million). Some $4.5 million of the NED total goes to non-media organizations, including the "Young Leaders for Good Governance Fellowship" (YLGGY), which has netted $300,000. In the Philippines, it is depicted as a program of the Jesse Robredo Foundation, which honors Robredo's late husband and is controlled by her family members. In the US, the YLGGY is promoted as a project of the International Republican Institute (IRI), one of the NED's four subsidiaries. It is thus not entirely clear whose national interest the YLGGY represents.

Indeed, despite stated transparency, these organizations and their money flows are clouded by murkiness (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2 ROBREDO'S CAMPAIGN: MONIES AND MEDIA

US government funds are only a part of the proxy monies. Along with billionaire investor George Soros' Open Society initiatives, other private "philanthropies" play a role as well. Rappler has been financed by the secretive billionaire, Pierre Omidyar, a supporter of "pro-democracy" regime change in several countries. In addition to media exposure by the NED-funded media, the Robredo campaign has been fueled by CNN Philippines, Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer and other media, owned by local oligarchs or family dynasties.

Reportedly, the Robredo campaign has also cultivated ties with far-left insurgents (which it has vehemently denied), waging decades-long war against the Philippine government.

Building on policy continuity

In contrast, Marcos and Duterte hope to consolidate the President's Build, Build, Build infrastructure initiatives, while promoting investment on human capital and health care. They prioritize the industrial, agricultural and tourism sector to create more jobs. They support women's rights, legalizing divorce and abortion in severe cases.

In foreign policy, Marcos and Duterte would retain military ties with the United States. However, they also plan to continue to recalibrate the economic relationship with China, which has become the Philippines' largest trading partner, the second-largest foreign investor and the second-largest source of foreign tourists.

Eager to avoid military entanglements, Marcos favors a non-confrontational stance with China. Overall, he wants to treat other countries as "friends and hopefully allies."

Marcos and Duterte support regional integration with their Southeast Asian peers. They stress Philippine interests in the South China Sea but also the Asean talks with China hoping the bilateral regional Code of Conduct (COC) would be completed soon.

The two shun the kind of rearmament drives and nuclearization that would undermine efforts at accelerated economic development in the region.

Last-minute 'surprises'?

At this point, only foul play could change the expected outcome. There are concerns about the integrity of the Commissions on Elections (Comelec) and its election technology, which suffered a huge data breach in January that could affect the election.

Through Mark Malloch Brown, odd links prevail between billionaire investor George Soros' Open Society Foundations (OSF), Soros Fund Management and Comelec's election software (Smartmatic). In 1986, Malloch Brown led Corazon Aquino's campaign against Ferdinand Marcos and his ties have remained close with the Aquinos ever since. He is president of both the US-based OSF and chairman of Smartmatic.

The big question is whether the Philippine future will be driven by military pacts, which benefit just tiny economic elites, or peaceful development, which fosters the living standards of most Filipinos.

Rising prosperity is only viable through peace and stability.

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized strategist of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (USA), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net

The commentary is based on Dr Steinbock's recent briefings, his op-ed in South China Morning Post ("Philippine election offers opportunity to rethink the liberal narrative," April 29, 2022) and China-US Focus ("The Coming Marcos-Duterte Philippine Election Triumph," April 29, 2022).

https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/05/02/opinion/columns/marcos-duterte-vs-robredos-proxy-campaign/1842004

BRIEF ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

 1.     What are the background facts?

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute involves both territorial and maritime claims.[1] The claimants include Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan (China), and Vietnam.[2] The dispute relates to islands, reefs, banks, other features, and waters.[3]

In pursuit of their respective claims, the claimants have occupied various maritime features,[4] shown in the following map:[5]
 

See also the following map.[6]

Incidentally, a major party to the dispute is a nuclear-weapon State, China.[7] Aside from the SCS issue, China is also involved in other territorial disputes.[8]

 

2.     What are the applicable laws?

From the Philippine perspective, the applicable laws include the following:

a.     (a) 1987 Constitution, Article I, National Territory,[9]

b.     (b) Pres. Dec. No. 1596, Declaring the Kalayaan Island Group as Philippine Territory (1978),

c.     (c) Pres. Dec. No. 1599, Establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines (1978),

d.     (d) Rep. Act No. 9522, Defining the Baselines of the Philippine Territorial Sea (2009),

e.     (e) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal States and for other purposes (1982),[10]

f.      (f) Award, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2013-19, lodged by the Philippines against China (2016).[11]

UNCLOS as international law affirms that maritime resources beyond national jurisdiction are the “common heritage of mankind.” UNCLOS, Sixth Recital. It recognizes sovereignty only over archipelagic waters and the territorial sea (12 miles from baseline). UNCLOS, Articles 2 & 3. It mandates that the coastal State has the sovereign right to exploit and manage natural resources, living and non-living, in its EEZ (200 miles from baseline). UNCLOS, Articles 56 & 57. It provides that the coastal State has the sovereign right to construct or authorize construction of artificial islands, installations, structures in its EEZ. UNCLOS, Article 60. It states that the coastal State has the sovereign right to determine allowable catch of living resources in its EEZ. UNCLOS, Article 61. No State may subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. UNCLOS, Article 89.

Strictly speaking, to classify PCA Case No. 2013-19 as an arbitration award may be of doubtful legality. This is because only one party to the dispute participated, the Philippines. The other party to the dispute, China, did not participate.

Instead of classifying the case as an arbitration award, it may be more reasonable to cite it as an Advisory Opinion, having been rendered by an arbitration tribunal.[12] Notably, an advisory opinion adjudicates nothing and is not binding. However, it may nonetheless be cited as evidence of the law.[13]

 

3.     How do we move forward to resolve the dispute?

For the Philippines, the twin policies of “quiet diplomacy” and a “strong military” are suggested in dealing with other claimants, particularly China.[14]

For “quiet diplomacy,” we may take the following formal and informal actions simultaneously:[15]

a.     (a) conduct bilateral negotiations with China (i.e. technical and financial assistance agreement or service contract to develop energy sources [i.e. oil and gas) with 60/40 sharing of revenues; turn-over of possession of artificial islands inside PH EEZ [i.e. Mischief Reef] not later than the expiry of the service agreement; fisheries access agreement),

b.     (b) conduct multi-lateral negotiations with ASEAN plus China (i.e. Code of Conduct based on UNCLOS; zone of peace, freedom and neutrality; non-aggression pact; fisheries access agreement),

c.     (c) seek and establish relations with political / military / civil society groups in China and Taiwan (China), open to adopting UNCLOS, instead of the Nine-Dash Line, to the extent possible,

d.     (d) seek and communicate directly with the Chinese people (in Chinese language) through social media and mainstream media, to promote respect for international law, specifically UNCLOS, instead of the Nine-Dash Line (i.e. territorial claims refer to land; claims to territorial sea are measured from land; territorial sea is 12 miles only; there is no territorial sea for 1000 miles; there is no territorial claim solely to waters without land; even claims to archipelagic waters refer to the outermost islands).

For a “strong military,” it should be clarified that this is only meant to gain a respectable bargaining position in diplomatic negotiations with other claimants, particularly China. It is certainly not intended to pursue the taking or retaking of maritime features in the SCS through military action.

To this end, a “strong military” should be one that is capable not only of defending the Philippine EEZ, but a force also capable of projecting power beyond the EEZ. In realpolitik, this may be only way to persuade the other claimants, particularly China, to conclude a fair, just and equitable working arrangement with smaller States, like the Philippines.[16]

 

Atty. Dindo B. Donato

General Counsel

Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc.

14 April 2022. Makati City, Philippines.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of TanDem.

 

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[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_maritime_features_in_the_Spratly_Islands#Occupied_features

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea#/media/File:Spratly_with_flags.jpg

CIA. Cropped and Flags added by Estarapapax., Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

[6] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdfhttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1a/Spratly_Islands_in_the_South_China_Sea_Department_of_State_map_2016587286_%282015%29.jpg

United States, Department of State, cartographer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

[7] See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968).

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapon

[8] See Realpolitik in the South China Sea, D.B.Donato, 19 April 2020, that refers to contemporary history from approximately 1945 through the present, and reads in part as follows: 

“At the end of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), when the communists gained control of the mainland, and the nationalists retreated to Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took Uyghur in 1949, Eastern Kashmir in 1950, and Tibet also in 1950. These regions had long histories of self-rule, but the PLA forced their annexation. 

“The civil war in China resulted in the establishment of two de facto states on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait. The mainland adopted command economy, while the island embraced free-market economy.

“However, instead of accepting co-existence, like in North and South Korea and East and West Germany, the mainland pursued a One-China policy, isolating the island from the rest of the world, and reserving its “right to use force” for reunification.

“China also claims practically the entire South China Sea, with all the islands and waters covered by its Nine-Dash Line of demarcation.  This is so even without any historical evidence showing human settlements in the area.

“Realistically speaking, Chinese junk cargo ships that sailed only 5 knots, could not have exercised effective jurisdiction over islands, islets, cays and reefs 800 miles away. The Austronesian karakoa outrigger warships from the much nearer Southeast Asian archipelago sailed much faster at 15 knots.

“In 1982, China along with the coastal states of Asean, signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Among others, UNCLOS established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for coastal states.

“However, in violation of UNCLOS, the PLA constructed artificial islands and military installations right within the EEZ of the Philippines, i.e. Mischief Reef (1995).”

https://mainews.ph/features2/category/3-politics.html?download=62:realpolitik-in-the-south-china-sea

[9] Article I on National Territory of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows:

            “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with

            all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other

            territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or

            jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial

            domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the

            insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around

            between, the connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless

            of their breadth and dimensions, from part of the internal waters of

            the Philippines.”

[10] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

[11] https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf

[12] https://www.britannica.com/topic/advisory-opinion

[13] Id.

[14] COMMENTS on “Resolving PH-China maritime dispute,” D.B.Donato, 31 October 2019.

https://mainews.ph/features2/category/3-politics.html?download=56:comments-on-resolving-ph-china-maritime-dispute

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

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